Materiality, Language and the Production of Knowledge: Art, Subjectivity and Indigenous Ontology by Barrett, Estelle
Cultural Studies Review 
volume 21 number 2 September 2015 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/index 
pp. 101–19 





Cultural Studies Review 2015. © 2015 Estelle Barrett. This is an Open Access article distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported (CC BY 4.0) License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any 
medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, 
provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. 
Citation: Cultural Studies Review (CSR) 2015, 21, 4316, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/csr.v21i2.4316 
 
 
Materiality, Language and the Production of Knowledge 








	  	  If	  ontology	  concerns	  theories	  of	  being,	  and	  epistemology	  theories	  of	  knowing,	  how	  might	   we	   bring	   the	   two	   together	   to	   account	   for	   movements	   between	   being	   and	  knowing	   that	   constitute	   cultural	   production?	   Something	   occurs	   or	   lies	   behind	  language	   and	   meaning	   that	   must	   be	   acknowledged	   if	   we	   are	   to	   arrive	   at	   an	  explanation.	   In	  this	  essay,	   I	  examine	  some	  key	   ideas	  that	  emerge	   from	  the	  work	  of	  Julia	  Kristeva,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari	  on	  sensation	  and	  affect,	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  ontology	  and	  epistemology	  are	  inextricably	  entwined	  in	  knowledge	   production.1	   Kristeva’s	   perspective	   of	   creative	   practice	   not	   only	   aligns	  with	  the	  new	  materialist	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  agency	  of	  matter,	  but,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  it	  also	  affirms	  the	  dimension	  of	  human	  or	  subjective	  agency	  that	  is	  implicated	  in	  cultural	  production.	  The	   essay	   will	   move	   between	   Kristevan	   thought	   and	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	  reflections	   on	   the	   question,	   ‘What	   is	   philosophy?’,	   then,	   later,	   to	   an	   account	   of	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Australian	  Indigenous	  ontology	  and	  art	  by	  Brian	  Martin.2	  In	  weaving	  together	  some	  of	   the	   conceptual	   threads	   that	   emerge	   from	   these	   domains	   of	   thought,	   I	   hope	   to	  illuminate	   the	   relationship	  between	  being	   and	  knowing	  as	   living	   process.	   It	   is	   this	  notion	  of	  sentience,	  one	  that	  acknowledges	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  organic	  and	  the	   inorganic	   ‘meat’	   and	   the	   living	   body	   as	   the	   site	   of	   the	   production	   of	  meaning,	  which	  articulates	  the	  divergence	  in	  the	  materialist	  perspectives	  of	  these	  two	  bodies	  of	  thought.	  This	  divergence	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  different	  genealogies	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  Kristeva	  and	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari.	  A	   crucial	   difference	   between	   Kristeva’s	   and	   Deleuze’s	   accounts	   of	   creative	  production	   and	   transformation	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   dialectics.	   Kristeva	   recasts	   and	  overturns	   the	   Hegelian	   dialectic,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   a	   triadic	   struggle	   and	   the	  projection	  or	  movement	   towards	   transcendence,	  and	  recasts	  Hegel’s	  conception	  of	  ‘negativity’	   as	   the	   drive	   towards	   true	   knowledge	   or	   totality.	   Kristevan	   ‘negativity’	  points	  to	  the	  material	  (and	  therefore	  unconscious)	  dimension	  of	  our	  encounter	  with	  language	   in	   creative	   production	   and	   revolution.	   Operating	   dynamically	   and	  dialectically	  between	  the	  biological	  and	  social	  order,	  it	  ruptures	  the	  fixed	  categories	  and	  oppositions	  of	  language	  to	  produce	  not	  totality,	  but	  what	  Kristeva	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  ‘infinitesimal	  differentiation	  within	  the	  phenotext’.3	  Kristeva	  highlights	   the	  way	  art	  becomes	   a	   potent	   vehicle	   for	   articulating	   a	   dissenting	   subjectivity.	   The	   speaking	  subject	   is	   the	   split	   subject	   divided	   between	   conscious	   and	   unconscious	  motivations—between	  physiological	  processes	  and	  social	  constraints.	  Her	  notion	  of	  
negativity	   is	   founded	  on	  the	  dialogic	  and	  heterogeneous	  dimensions	  through	  which	  the	   subject	   and	   language	   operate.	   In	   Kristevan	   thought,	   heterogeneity	   implies	   a	  relationality	   that	   affirms	   difference,	   in	   that	   it	   is	   both	   material/biological	   and	  semiotic.	  This	  material-­‐semiotic	  (pace	  Haraway)	  affirms	  a	  radical	  immanence	  that	  is,	  at	   the	   same	   time,	   situated.4	   Hence	   Kristeva’s	   account	   of	   aesthetic	   experience	   as	  revolution	  articulates	  a	  second	  overturning	  (after	  Karl	  Marx)	  of	  Hegel’s	  dialectic	  that	  posits	   social	   and	   political	   struggle	   in	   terms	   of	   thesis,	   antithesis	   and	   synthesis.	  Hegel’s	   notion	   of	   dialectics	   puts	   consciousness	   first.	   Marx’s,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  emphasises	  the	  means	  of	  economic	  production	  and	  its	   inherent	  contradictions	  as	  a	  basis	   for	   dialectical	   development.	   The	   contradiction	   inherent	   in	   all	   things	  perpetuates	   the	  dialectic	  process	  and	  results	   in	  a	   cleavage,	  a	   struggle	  between	   the	  two	   elements	   of	   the	   contradiction	   that	   results	   in	   the	   elimination	   of	   the	   weaker	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element.	  According	  to	  Kristeva,	  art	  replaces	  economic	  materiality,	  and	  its	  underlying	  implication	   of	   transcendence,	  with	   biological	   process	   and	   aesthetics.	   For	   Kristeva,	  there	  is	  no	  essential	  separation	  between	  body	  and	  mind.	  Biology—the	  rhythms	  and	  drives	   operating	   through	   the	   body	   as	   instinctual	   responsiveness	   to	   objects	   in	   the	  world	   (the	   semiotic)	   is	   crucial	   to,	   and	   part	   of,	   our	   signifying	   processes.	   Aesthetic	  experience	   implies	  a	  heterogeneous	  sentient	  and	  relational	   subject—one	  that	   is,	  at	  the	   same	   time,	   constituted	   through	   material	   biological	   processes	   and	   language.	  Transformations	   that	   occur	   in	   subjectivity	   can	   thus	   be	   understood	   as	   causal	   and	  
situated.	   They	   result	   in	   transformations	   of	   language	   and	   have	   the	   potential	   to	  transform	  discourse,	  because	  the	  subject	   is	  not	  only	  material	  process	  but	   is	  also	   in	  and	   of	   language.	   By	   turning	   inward	   to	   the	   material	   processes	   of	   subjectivity,	  Kristeva’s	  notion	  of	  practice	  and	  dialectics	  goes	  beyond	  a	  view	  of	  contradiction	  that	  involves	   a	   replacement	   of	   one	   contradiction	   or	   thesis	   with	   another.	   Her	   view	   of	  dialectics	   originates	   in	   the	  work	   of	   René	   Thom	   and	   is	   grounded	   on	   the	   theory	   of	  catastrophe—the	   idea	   that	   small	   changes	   and	   contradictions	   in	   minor	   parts	   of	   a	  non-­‐linear	  system	  or	  field	  of	  forces	  can	  cause	  instabilities	  of	  attraction	  and	  repulsion	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  sudden	  changes	  in	  the	  whole	  system.	  In	  this	  model,	  when	  elements	  in	   the	   system	   lose	   equilibrium	   or	   are	   shattered,	   one	   element	   does	   not	   replace	  another,	   but	   shattered	   elements	   reform	   to	   bring	   about	   a	   completely	   new	   (but	  nevertheless	   heterogeneous)	   system	   or	   object.	   As	   will	   be	   discussed	   later	   in	   this	  essay,	   Kristeva’s	   elaboration	   of	   the	   chora	   and	   of	   pre-­‐Oedipal	   process	   provides	   an	  explanation	   of	   the	   co-­‐constitutive	   relationship	   between	   meaning	   and	   matter	   in	  processes	   that	   are	   laid	   down	   prior	   to	   the	   subject’s	   entry	   into	   language;	   such	  processes	  illuminate	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  subject	  as	  a	  ‘filter’	  through	  which	  the	  world	  is	  transformed	   into	   language	   and	   thought.	   This	   aspect	   of	   her	   thought	   also	   deviates	  from	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  conceptions	  of	  ‘affect’	  and	  the	  ‘body	  without	  organs’.	  	  Deleuze’s	   anti-­‐Hegelianism	   originates	   in	   Nietzsche’s	   notion	   of	   genealogy	   and	  the	  will	   to	  power	  underpinned	  by	  a	   focus	  on	   the	  productivity	  of	   the	  nondialectical	  differential	  forces.	  ‘Let	  us	  recall	  Nietzsche’s	  idea	  of	  the	  eternal	  return	  a	  little	  ditty,	  a	  refrain,	   but	   which	   captures	   the	   mute	   and	   unthinkable	   forces	   of	   the	   Cosmos.’5	  Immanence,	  virtuality,	   forces,	  speed,	  movement	  and	  genesis,	  rather	  than	  dialectics,	  are	   key	   concepts	   underpinning	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   account	   of	   production	   and	  transformation.	  In	  its	  movement	  towards	  becoming,	  ‘the	  body	  is	  also	  mere	  body,	  just	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matter	  under	  the	  pulsation	  of	  cosmic	  forces,	  the	  same	  that	  moves	  dust	  and	  planets	  in	   the	   universe’.6	   Arthur	   Kroker	   also	   illuminates	   the	   tendency	   in	   Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	   to	   abstract	   the	  body,	   reducing	   it	   to	   inorganic	  matter.	  He	  observes	   that	   to	  enter	  the	  body	  of	  their	  texts	  is	  to	   ‘experience	  a	  fantastic	  psychological	  curvature	  of	  the	  dematerialization	  and	  decontextualization	  of	  one’s	  own	  missing	  body’.7	  Through	  insistence	   on	   notions	   of	   forces	   and	   intensities	   and	   the	   machinic	   ‘body	   without	  organs’	   in	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   account	   of	   cultural	   production,	   the	   specific	  relational	   heterogeneity	   of	   carnal	   materiality	   is	   elided—movement	   or	   capture	  occurs	   outside.	   This	   tendency	   is	   evident	   in	   Deleuze’s	   Francis	   Bacon:	   The	   Logic	   of	  
Sensation,	   where	   the	   focus	   remains	   predominantly	   on	   the	   external	   object	   and	   the	  ‘rhythmic	   unity	   of	   the	   senses	   can	   be	   discovered	   only	   by	   going	   beyond	   the	  organism’.8	  	  In	   What	   is	   Philosophy?	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   put	   forward	   a	   materialist	  conception	   of	   knowledge	   production,	   which	   they	   describe	   as	   ‘the	   art	   of	   forming,	  inventing	   and	   fabricating	   concepts’.9	   However,	   while	   they	   do	   acknowledge	   the	  implication	  of	  the	  human	  subject	  through	  their	  notion	  of	  conceptual	  personae,	  they	  do	  not	  fully	  elucidate	  the	  crucial	  relationship	  between	  biology,	  matter	  and	  language	  that	   gives	   rise	   to	   semiosis	   as	   an	   ineluctable	   foundation	   of	   onto-­‐epistemology.	  Kristevan	   thought	   provides	   a	   model	   for	   understanding	   how	   material-­‐discursive	  practices	   emerge	   from	   corporeal	   responses	   and	   are	   translated	   into	   language	   and	  thought.	   In	   experience-­‐in-­‐practice	   there	   is	   a	   constant	   movement	   between	   the	  material	  world,	   the	  rhythmic	  unity	  biological/material	   self	   (the	  self	  as	   ‘other’)	  and	  the	  social	  self.	  This	  movement	  instantiates	  a	  performative	  production	  of	  knowledge	  or	  onto-­‐epistemology.	  ‘Permeability’	  is	  a	  useful	  term	  for	  unravelling	  Kristeva’s	  account	  of	  the	  complex	  relationship	   between	   body	   and	   mind	   and	   individual	   and	   society	   as	   a	   dynamic	  process	  of	  how	  we	  come	  to	  make	  meaning.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  that	  humans	  are	  continuous	  with	  nature	  and	  other	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  Biological	  processes	  that	  support	   and	   enable	   human	   life	   operate	   as	   a	   semiotic	   ‘filter’	   and	   this	   filtering	  attributes	   value	   to	   objects	   encountered	   via	   sensation	   and	   affect.	   Through	   her	  conception	  of	  the	  chora,	  and	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  infant	  and	  the	  mother’s	  body,	  Kristeva	  demonstrates	   that	  human	  consciousness	  and	   language	  are	  products	  of	  these	  ‘filtering’	  processes.	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A	   crucial	   distinction	   between	   Kristeva’s	   and	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   accounts	  can	  be	  found	  in	  their	  differing	  conceptions	  of	  ‘affect’	  and	  the	  emphasis	  that	  Kristeva	  places	  on	  the	  link	  between	  affect	  and	  language.	  Affect	  is	  hardwired	  into	  the	  human	  biological	   system	   as	   an	   instinctual	   mechanism	   for	   warding	   off—impelling	   the	  organism	  away	  from—what	  is	  sensed	  as	  dangerous	  and	  harmful	  and	  for	  registering	  pleasurable	   sensations.	   In	   departing	   from	   Freud,	   Kristeva	   suggests	   that	   both	  negative	   and	   positive	   affect	   have	   the	   power	   to	   impel;	   both	   can	   therefore	   be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  agency.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  phase	  where	  pleasure	  or	  un-­‐pleasure	  is	  registered	  that	  objects	  begin	  to	  take	  on	  value	  or	  become	  perceptions	  as	  opposed	  to	  what	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	   call	   ‘percepts’	   or	   sensations	   that	   are	   ‘independent	   of	   a	  state	  of	  those	  who	  experience	  them’.10	  Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   conceive	   affects	   as	   non-­‐human	   becomings	   or	   blocs	   of	  sensation	   that	   occur	   when	   material	   passes	   into	   sensation.	   They	   explain	   that	   this	  takes	   place	   within	   a	   zone	   or	   phase	   of	   indetermination	   and	   indiscernibility	   that	  immediately	   precedes	   natural	   differentiation.	   In	   this	   framework	   affects	   are	   non-­‐
human	  compounds	  of	   sensation	   that	  occur	  when	  humans	  become	  continuous	  with	  the	  material	  world.	  When	  sensation	  becomes	  sensation	  of	  a	  concept,	  the	  composite	  sensation	  is	  reterritorialised.11	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  account	  of	  these	  human/non-­‐human	  transformations	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  couched	  in	  abstractions	  that	  do	  not	  fully	  explain	   the	   movement	   from	   the	   material	   process	   (blocs	   of	   undifferentiated	  sensation	   as	   being)	   to	   the	   subject	   of	   language	   and	   thought.	   Kristeva’s	   notion	   of	  heterogeneity,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   precludes	   the	   conception	   of	   pure	   or	  undifferentiated	   sensation	   of	   (human)	   beings.	   Central	   to	   understanding	   this	   and	  how	  being	  and	   language	   co-­‐emerge	   is	  what	  Kristeva	  has	   theorised	  as	   the	   semiotic	  
chora	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  language:	  the	  ‘symbolic’—language	  as	  it	  signifies	  (the	  communicative	   function	  of	   language)—and	  the	   ‘semiotic’	   language	  as	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  material	  or	  biological	  processes	  closely	  implicated	  in	  affect.12	  
—THE SEMIOTIC AND THE SYMBOLIC The	   semiotic	   chora,	   the	   space	   or	   site	   of	   biological	   interactions	   and	   exchanges	  between	  the	  infant	  and	  the	  mother’s	  body,	  registers	  the	  first	  imprints	  of	  experience	  that	   are	   rudimentary	   signals	   of	   language	   that	   will	   follow.	   It	   is	   an	   articulation	   of	  bodily	   drives,	   energy	   charges	   and	   psychical	   marks—a	   non-­‐expressive	   totality,	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known	   through	   its	   effects.	   This	   constitutes	   the	   heterogeneity	   that	   distinguishes	  human	  biology	  and	  psychic	  life	  from	  the	  outset.	  It	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  dynamism	  of	  the	  body	  constantly	  in	  motion	  and	  perpetually	  seeking	  to	  maximise	  the	  capacities	  of	  the	   living	  organism.	  It	   is	  a	  complex	  of	  pulsations—intensities,	   tensions	  and	  release	  of	   tensions	   that	   occur	   through	   interactions	   with	   what	   lies	   beyond	   or	   outside	   the	  living	  system.	  Kristeva	  tells	  us	  that	  operations	  of	  the	  chora	  organise	  pre-­‐verbal	  psychic	  space	  according	   to	   logical	   categories	   that	   precede	   and	   transcend	   language.	   These	  operations	   or	   semiotic	   functions,	   which	   are	   constituted	   through	   biological	   drives	  and	   energy	   discharges,	   initially	   oriented	   around	   the	   mother’s	   body,	   persist	   as	   an	  asymbolic	  modality	  that	  governs	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  body	  and	  the	   ‘other’	  throughout	   the	   life	   of	   the	   subject.	   They	   articulate	   a	   continuum	   between	   the	   body	  and	  external	  objects	  and	  between	  the	  body	  and	  language.13	  We	  may	  now	  understand	  the	   ‘semiotic’	   as	   an	  alternative	  material	   ‘code’	   of	   language,	   a	   ‘bodily	  knowing’	   that	  nonetheless	   implicates	   itself	   in	   relays	   of	   meaning	   that	   are	   manifested	   in	   social	  relations.	  In	   creative	   production,	   entanglements	   or	   enfoldments	   between	   the	   body	   and	  objects	  give	  rise	  to	  drives	  or	  impulses	  that	  are	  articulated	  by	  the	  semiotic	  and	  result	  in	   variations	   and	   multiplicity	   of	   meanings	   that	   may	   be	   produced.	   The	   semiotic	  disposition	  of	   language,	  which	  corresponds	   to	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  describe	  as	   harmonies,	   rhythms	   or	   style,	   establishes	   a	   relational	   functioning	   between	   the	  signifying	   code	   and	   the	   fragmented	   or	   drive-­‐ridden	   body	   of	   the	   speaking	   (and	  hearing/seeing)	  subject.14	  This	  putting-­‐into-­‐process	  of	   language	  must	  connect	  with	  our	  biological	  processes,	  affects	  and	  feelings	  in	  a	  vital	  way	  if	   language	  is	  to	  take	  on	  particular	  meanings	  or	  to	  affect	  us.	  Creative	  practice	  or	  ‘the	  productive	  performance’	  of	   language	   maintains	   the	   link	   between	   the	   semiotic	   and	   the	   symbolic,	   between	  discourse	   and	   our	   lived	   and	   situated	   experiences—our	   material	   being	   in	   the	  world—because	   unlike	   Deleuze	   and	   Guttari’s	   body	   without	   organs,	   the	   body	   in	  Kristeva’s	   articulation	   of	   practice	   is	   always	   already	   heterogeneously	   constituted.	  Three	   terms,	   ‘negativity’,	   ‘rejection’	   and	   ‘signifiance’	   are	   crucial	   to	   understanding	  Kristeva’s	  account	  of	  language	  as	  material	  process	  that	  is	  predicated	  on	  relationality.	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—NEGATIVITY AND REJECTION ‘Negativity’	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  processes	  of	  semiotic	  motility	  and	  charges	  or	  ‘death	  drive’,	  a	   force	  that	   impels	  movement	  towards	  an	  undifferentiated	  or	  archaic	  phase	   that	  precedes	   the	   subject’s	   entry	   into	   language.	  Kristeva	  draws	  on	  Freud	   to	  explain	   negativity	   as	   a	   drive	   or	   urge,	   inherent	   in	   organic	   life	   to	   return	   to	   earlier	  states.15	   Negativity	   operates	   dynamically	   and	   dialectically	   between	   the	   biological	  and	   social	   order,	   replacing	   the	   fixed	   categories	   and	   oppositions	   of	   language	   to	  produce	   what	   Kristeva	   refers	   to	   as	   an	   ‘infinitesimal	   differentiation	   within	   the	  phenotext’.16	  	  Negativity	   is	   closely	   related	   to,	   and	   cannot	   be	   considered	   apart	   from,	   two	  related	   concepts	   in	   Kristeva’s	   account	   of	   language	   as	  material	   process.	   She	   posits	  ‘expenditure’	  or	  ‘rejection’	  as	  better	  terms	  for	  explaining	  the	  movement	  of	  material	  contradictions	   that	   generate	   the	   semiotic	   function.	   If	   negativity	   is	   a	   motility	   or	  dynamism	   that	   seeks	   an	   undifferentiated	   state,	   rejection	   is	   what	   repeatedly	  interrupts	   this	   movement.	   Rejection	   moves	   between	   the	   two	   poles	   of	   drives	   and	  consciousness.	  Think	  of	  negativity	  and	  rejection	  working	  together	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  pre-­‐linguistic	  pulse	  that	  sets	  up	  a	  constant	  rhythmic	  responsiveness	  to	  language	  and	  to	  other	   objects	   in	   the	  world.	   Rejection	   constitutes	   the	   shattering	   of	   unity	   or	   unified	  meaning.	   It	   has	   a	   relation	   or	   connection	   to	   language,	   but	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   what	  Kristeva	  refers	  to	  as	  scission	  or	  separation	  that	  opens	  up	  a	  crucible	  of	  intensities	  and	  sensation	   where	   meaning	   is	   ruptured,	   superseded	   and	   exceeded.17	   This	   is	   an	  indication	  of	   the	   asymbolic	   functioning	  of	   the	   chora	  as	  discussed	   above.	  However,	  rejection	   is	   ambiguous	   in	   that	   it	   is	   also	   a	   precondition	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	  meanings	   and	   renewed	   or	   recuperated	   subjectivity.	   The	   perpetual	   rhythms	   and	  workings	  of	  material	   and	  biological	  processes	   that	  maintain	   the	   living	  organism—negativity–rejection	   …	   negativity–rejection—are	   continuous	   with	   processes	   that	  produce	  the	  subject,	  language	  and	  meaning.	  They	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  ‘filtering’	  that	  transforms	  stimuli	  into	  coherent	  form.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  at	  this	  stage,	  is	  that	  in	  aesthetic	  experience	  both	  the	  production	  and	  reception	  of	  the	  artwork	  inscribes	  negativity	   and	   rejection	   by	   bringing	   the	   symbolic	   function	   into	   an	   encounter	  with	  the	   semiotic	  or	  material	  dimensions	  of	   the	  work.	  This	   results	   in	   an	  unsettling	  and	  multiplying	  of	  meaning,	  and	  the	  work	  is	  experienced	  both	  as	  material	  object	  and	  as	  a	  form	   of	   representation,	   as	   will	   be	   illustrated	  with	   reference	   to	   the	  work	   of	   Brian	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Martin.	  The	  ongoing	  renewal	  and	  production	  of	   the	  subject	  or	  subjectivity	   through	  material	  processes	  underpins	  the	  ongoing	  renewal	  and	  production	  of	  language	  and	  meaning	  in	  creative	  practice	  as	  onto-­‐epistemology.	  
—SIGNIFIANCE  The	   term	   signifiance	   distinguishes	   the	   supplementary	   signifying	   process	   that	  operates	   beyond	   established	   codes	   from	   signification—the	   conventional	   way	   in	  which	  words	  signify	  meaning.18	  Signifiance	   is	  an	  alternative	  signifying	  process,	   the	  result	   of	   the	  heterogeneous	  workings	  of	   language	  which	   articulates	  both	   symbolic	  and	   semiotic	   dispositions:	   language	   as	   it	   is	   conventionally	   coded	   as	   opposed	   to	  material/sensory	   articulations	   of	   language—sound,	   rhythm	   and	   prosody	   in	   verbal	  language;	   colour,	   line	   and	   other	   formal	   elements	   in	   visual	   language.	   This	   double	  articulation	  of	  language	  allows	  the	  text	  or	  artwork	  that	  emerges	  from	  experience-­‐in-­‐practice,	   to	  signify	  what	  the	  communicative	  or	  representative	  function	  of	  the	  work	  cannot	   say.19	   Signifiance	   allows	   us	   to	   grasp	   how	   words	   or	   verbal	   and	   visual	  utterances	   can	   be	   charged	   with	   multiple	   and	   hitherto	   unimagined	   meanings.	   In	  Edvard	  Munch’s	  (1893)	  painting	  The	  Scream	  for	  example,	  this	  relationship	  becomes	  apparent.	  The	  unity	  of	  the	  composition	  is	  constantly	  disrupted	  by	  the	  impact	  of	  lines	  creating	   dynamism	   and	   movement	   and	   breaking	   up	   the	   compositional	   space.	  Ambiguity	   and	   indeterminacy	   give	   rise	   to	   multiple	   meanings—for	   example,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   distinguish	   landscape	   from	   sky	   or	   to	   tell	   if	   the	   two	   figures	   in	   the	  background	   are	   approaching	   or	   receding;	   if	   viewing	   is	   sustained	   over	   a	   longer	  period	   of	   time,	   the	   retinal	   impact	   of	   colour	   and	   line	   in	   this	   painting	   operate	  synaesthetically	   to	   become	   ‘noise’	   and	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   painting	   induces	   not	  meaning	  but	  sensation.	  Thus	  we	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  semiotic,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  a	  precondition	  for	  the	  symbolic,	  also	  functions	  synchronically	  with	  the	  symbolic.	  The	  marks,	  swirling	  lines	  and	  brushstrokes	  in	  Munch’s	  painting	  both	  indicate	  and	  exceed	  their	  representational	  and	  compositional	  functions.	  Sensation,	  language	  and	  thought	  become	   concurrent	   and	   interchangeable	   and	   the	   boundaries	   between	   them	   are	  permeable.	  The	  work	  captures	  the	  artist’s	  particular	  lived	  and	  embodied	  experience	  and	  preserves	  it	  in	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  describe	  as	  a	  ‘bloc	  of	  sensation’.20	  The	  work	  is	  not	  only	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  scream,	  it	  is	  the	  scream	  as	  sensation:	  these	  two	  elements	  affect	  the	  viewer	  simultaneously.	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In	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  schema	  such	  a	  work	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  percepts	  and	  affects	  that	  engender	  a	  non-­‐human	  becoming,	  where	  being	  and	  the	  world	  merge	  as	  material	  process.	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  this	  erasure	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  emanation	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art	  without	  falling	  into	  mysticism?	  Kristevan	  psychoanalysis	  provides	  us	  with	   a	   way	   out	   of	   the	   impasse	   through	   its	   account	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  biological	   processes	   and	   thought/language.	   In	   a	   sense,	   psychoanalysis	   gestures	  towards	   notions	   of	   a	   ‘transcendental’	   that	   neither	   privileges	   the	   Cartesian	   subject	  nor	   social	   constructivist	   accounts	   of	   the	   subject.	   Kristevan	   thought,	   with	   its	  insistence	   on	   heterogeneity,	   does	   not	   fully	   jettison	   the	   human	   or	   subjective	  dimension	  of	  this	  process	  because	  in	  Kristeva’s	  framework	  the	  subject	  as	  sensation,	  as	   sentient	   being,	   is	   also	   an	   already	   (relationally)	   constituted	   and	   heterogeneous	  entity.	  	  It	  has	  perhaps	  become	  clear	  from	  the	  discussion	  so	  far	  that	  words	  and	  images	  impinge	  on	  the	  body	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  objects.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  acknowledge	  that	  philosophical	  concepts	  are	  sensibilia	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  aesthetic	  objects	  are	  sensibilia.21	  Aesthetic	   experience	   also	   corresponds	  with	  what	   they	  describe	   as	   the	  moment	  material	  passes	   into	  sensation	  and	  articulates	  a	  zone	  where	  we	  no	   longer	  know	  which	  is	  animal	  and	  which	  is	  human.22	  What	  Kristeva	  provides,	  however,	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  originary	  processes	  that	  link	  bodily	  processes	  to	  language.	  This	  is	   fundamental	   to	  grasping	  the	   idea	  of	  creative	  production	  as	  material	  process	  and	  as	  an	  alternative	  mode	  of	  semiosis.	  In	  Art	  beyond	  Representation,	  Barbara	  Bolt	  illustrates	  this	  with	  her	  description	  of	   experience-­‐in-­‐practice	  as	   ‘working	  hot’.23	   In	  material	  practices	   such	  as	  painting,	  there	   is	   an	   intensification	   of	   contradiction	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   unpredictable	  and/or	   accidental	   effects	   produced	   by	   the	   interactions	   of	   the	   materials	   and	   tools	  used	   in	   the	   making	   of	   the	   work.	   Often,	   this	   requires	   speedy	   and	   spontaneous	  responses	  which	  leave	  no	  time	  or	  space	  for	  rational	  thought.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  as	  Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   imply	   and	   as	   Judith	   Butler	   has	   claimed	   in	   her	   notion	   of	  performativity,	   that	   the	   subject	   is,	   strictly	   speaking,	   absent.24	   The	   issue	   of	   the	  subject’s	  absence	  in	  performativity	  turns	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  already	  constituted	  subject	  of	   language/discourse	  and	   the	   subject	  of	  practice—the	  subject	  as	  being.	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In	  Revolution	  in	  Poetic	  Language,	  Kristeva	  tells	  us	  that	  ‘the	  subject	  never	  is,	  the	  subject	  is	  only	  the	  signifying	  process	  and	  he	  appears	  only	  as	  a	  signifying	  practice’.25	  It	  is	   important	  not	   to	  mistake	   the	   inflection	   in	  Kristeva’s	   statement	   since	   it	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  total	  absence	  of	  the	  subject,	  but	  a	  movement	  towards,	  and	  appearance	  of,	  the	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  fluid	  and	  dynamic	  process.	  Elsewhere,	  Kristeva’s	  references	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  (human)	  subject	  relate	  to	  psychoanalytical	  accounts	  (particularly	  those	  of	  Lacan)—of	  the	  subject	  as	  it	  is	  positioned	  or	  coalesced	  through	  the	  symbolic	  and	  the	  social.	  In	  her	  theorisation	  of	  creative	  practice,	  however,	  Kristeva’s	  notion	  of	  the	   ‘speaking	   subject’	   goes	   beyond	   such	   accounts	   by	   positing	   heterogeneity.	   This	  casts	  a	  different	  light	  on	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  notion	  of	  ‘sensation	  as	  being’	  and	  on	  their	   description	   of	   affects	   as	   ‘non-­‐human	   becomings’	   of	   man.26	   The	   notion	   of	  heterogeneity	  acknowledges	  another	  register	  or	  prevailing	  presence	  of	  ‘subjectivity’	  as	  material	  process	  and	  contradiction	  that	  constitute	  different	  forms	  of	  agency.	  The	  experience	   of	   practice	   puts	   the	   subject	   in	   ‘process/on	   trial’,	   a	   condition	   in	   which	  subjective	   processes	   are	   predominantly	   determined	   by	   biological	   processes	   and	  drives	  so	  that	  an	  alternative	  logic	  is	  at	  work;	  the	  logic	  of	  material	  process	  and	  of	  the	  unconscious	  where	  there	   is	   ‘no	  time’	   in	   the	  sense	  of	   linear	   temporality,	  and	  where	  the	   binaries	   and	   contradictions	   of	   the	   symbolic	   and	   established	  discourses	   do	   not	  hold.	   The	   knowledge	   or	   reality	   brought	   about	   by	   direct	   experience	   is	   thus	   a	  
signifying	  apprehension	  of	  a	  new	  heterogeneous	  object.27	  Hence	  the	  ‘subject’	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   filter	  or	  passageway	  where	  there	   is	  a	  struggle	  between	  conflicting	  tendencies	   or	   drives	   whose	   stases	   or	   representamen	   are	   rooted	   in	   affective	  processes.	  This	  point	   is	   crucial	   to	  understanding	  why	  and	  how	  Kristeva	  places	   the	  subject	   and	   forms	   of	   subjective	   agency,	   rather	   than	   mechanistic	   or	   automatic	  processes,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  revolutionary	  practice.	  The	  key	  is	  her	  conception	  of	  ‘affect’	  as	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  affects	  that	  originate	  in	  pleasure	  and	  displeasure.	  Pleasure	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   removal	   or	   absence	   of	   displeasure.	   In	  encounters	  with	  objects	  in	  the	  world,	  negativity	  and	  rejection	  give	  rise	  to	  sensation.	  However,	   following	   raw	   sensation	   is	   a	   concurrent	   emergence	   or	   registering	   of	  positive	  or	  negative	   affects	   that	   attribute	  value(s)	  or	   that	   ‘colour’	   encounters	  with	  the	   material	   world	   and	   other	   sensibilia.	   This	   constitutes	   a	   movement	   towards	  thought	   and	   symbolic	   language.	   The	   question	   of	   just	   how	   this	   shift	   occurs	   still	  remains.	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The	   psychoanalytical	   term	   ‘cathexis’	   is	   pertinent	   here.	   Synonymous	   with	  ‘investment’,	   cathexis	   is	   a	   drive	   that	   produces	   subjective	   motivation	   or	   volition	  towards	  both	   libidinal	  and	   discursive	  economies.	  Charles	  Rycroft	  describes	   it	   as	   ‘a	  quantity	   of	   energy	   attaching	   to	   any	   object	   or	   mental	   structure’.28	   ‘Hypercathexis’	  involves	  an	  intensity	  of	  investment	  in	  one	  process	  or	  set	  of	  configurations	  in	  order	  to	  repress	  others.29	  Cathexis	  is	  a	  moment	  of	  the	  coalescing	  of	  subjectivity	  according	  to	   the	   pleasures	   and	   displeasures	   of	   our	   encounters	   with	   objects—something	  between	  an	  emotional	  commitment	  and	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  relative	  rewards	  and	  satisfactions	   offered	   in	   processes	   of	   making	   and	   interpreting	   art	   and	   indeed	   in	  experiences	   of	   everyday	   life.	   The	   notion	   of	   cathexis	   permits	   an	   understanding	   of	  movements	  between	  being	  and	  knowing	  or	  the	  culminating	  point	  that	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  call	  ‘reterritorialisation’.30	  From	  this	  we	  may	  argue	   for	  a	  materialist	   ‘transcendental’;	  material	  process	  as	  an	  infinite	  unfolding	  or	  two-­‐way	  movement	  between	  the	  material	  world,	  biological	  processes	   and	   discourse.	   The	   subject	   as	   biological	   organism,	   or	   being,	   is	   a	   ‘filter’	  through	  which	  objects	  pass	   as	   raw	  sensation	  and	  are	   then	   ‘transubstantiated’	   into	  language.	  In	  experience-­‐in-­‐practice	  language	  becomes	  the	  space	  of	  an	  alternative	  or	  translinguistic	  representation	  that	  allows	  a	  transfer	  from	  instinctual	  conflict	  arising	  from	   the	   physiological	   on	   one	   hand,	   and	   conscious	   thought	   on	   the	   other.	   Situated	  between	  the	  body	  (energy,	  drive,	  excitability)	  and	  mind	  (representation),	  ‘language	  allows	  thought	  to	  reach	  and	  stabilise	  energy’.31	  The	  focus	  on	  subjective	  processes	  as	  forms	  of	  agency	  must	  also	  be	  understood	  in	   relation	   to	   the	   ‘agency’	   of	   materiality	   itself.	   Kristeva’s	   work	   acknowledges	   the	  agency	  of	   ‘brute’	  materiality.	   In	  her	  account	   there	   is	  no	  opposition	  between	   inside	  and	  outside—consciousness	  and	  materiality	  are	  mutually	  constitutive	  and	  enfolded.	  This	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  onto-­‐epistemological	  practice	  and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  articulate	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘new	  materialism’.	  
—INDIGENOUS ONTOLOGY The	   notion	   of	   ‘onto-­‐epistemology’	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   all	   cultural	   production	   is	  articulated	  in	  Australian	  artist	  Brian	  Martin’s	  practice	  and	  his	  account	  of	  Australian	  Indigenous	   ontology.	   Martin	   tells	   us	   that	   in	   an	   Indigenous	   worldview	   it	   is	   self-­‐evident	   that	   the	   immaterial	   and	   the	   imaginary,	   the	   real	   and	   representation,	   occur	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interchangeably	  and	  concurrently.	  Through	  his	  art	  practice	  and	  elaboration	  of	  what	  he	  calls	   ‘real	  immateriality’,	  Martin	  brings	  a	  fresh	  perspective	  to	  understanding	  the	  movements	  that	  occur	  between	  the	  material	  world,	  being	  and	  knowing.	  The	   relationship	   of	   culture	   and	   ‘land’	   or	   ‘Country’	   is	   the	   foundation	   of	  Indigenous	  ideology	  and	  culture.	  In	  a	  traditional	  Aboriginal	  society,	  movement	  with	  and	  in	  Country	  defines	  material	  existence	  as	  ways	  of	  being,	  ways	  of	  doing	  and	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  This	  relationship	  constitutes	  and	   is	  constituted	  by	   the	   interconnection	  of	  memory,	  life	  and	  culture,	  which	  are	  embedded	  in	  Country:	  Indigenous	  art	  practices	  manifest	   this	   trinity.	  Within	   this	   framework,	   the	  immaterial	   is	   materially	   constituted	   by	   the	   real	   material	   conditions	   of	  existence,	   where	   the	   immaterial	   itself,	   becomes	   a	   reality.	   This	  ‘immateriality’	   in	   Indigenous	   cultural	   ideology	   is	   manifest	   in	   the	   real	  existence	  of	  Country	  and	  ever	  continuing	  cultural	  practices.32	  The	   interrelatedness	   of	   material	   existence	   and	   cultural	   production	   challenges	  dominant	   Western	   discourse	   and	   conceptions	   of	   art	   formulated	   in	   a	  representationalist	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  ontological	  relationship	  that	  people	  have	  to	  Country	   is	  vital	   in	  Indigenous	  cultural	  practices	  where	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  referent	  and	  the	  sign	  is	  causal	  and	  reciprocal.	  Indigenous	  ontology	  and	  cultural	  practices	  are	  based	  on	  a	  methexical	  relationship,	  or	  what	  Paul	  Carter	  describes	  as	  a	  performative	  action	  that	  brings	  something	  into	  being	  and	  existence.33	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  emu	  dance	  is	  performed,	  the	  being	  of	  sensation	  of	  the	  dancer	   is	  emu	  and	  the	   aesthetic	   image	   produced	   transfers	   the	   sensation	   of	   the	   dancer’s	   lived	  experience	   to	   the	   audience.	   Pertinent	   here	   is	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari’s	   notion	   of	   the	  artwork	  as	  ‘monument’.	  The	  artwork	  as	  monument	  does	  not	  commemorate	  the	  past,	  but	  is	  a	  bloc	  of	  present	  sensations.34	  In	  this	  example	  it	  engenders	  a	  becoming	  emu	  of	  both	  the	  dancer	  and	  the	  audience.	  Martin	  observes	  that	  this	  methexical	  relationship,	  which	   entails	   a	   collapse	   between	   the	   ontological	   and	   the	   representational,	  emphasises	   the	   physical/material	   ground	   of	   Indigenous	   practices	   and	   permits	   an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	   ‘real’	  and	  the	   ‘immaterial’,	   the	   ‘imaginary’,	   the	   ‘spiritual’	  
and	   the	   ‘representational’	   operate	   concurrently	   as	   ‘real	   immateriality’.	   It	   is	   this	  interrelatedness	  and	  its	  effects	  that	  assign	  value	  and	  meaning	  in	  Indigenous	  cultural	  production	  and	  worldview.	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In	  Indigenous	  culture	  there	  is	  also	  no	  distinction	  between	  art,	  culture	  and	  living	  or	  being.	   In	  Aboriginal	   languages	  words	  used	   about	   art	   are	  not	  nouns,	   but	  denote	  action.	  The	  artwork	  enacts	   the	   thing	  so	   that	  a	  painted	   landscape,	   tree	  or	  animal	   is	  the	  thing	  itself.	  Making	  and	  viewing	  artworks	  involves	  a	  re-­‐experiencing	  of	  the	  thing.	  As	  Martin	  explains	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  works	  of	  Kathleen	  Petyarre,	  Margaret	  Petyarre	   and	   Badger	   Bates	   in	   ‘Immaterial	   Land’,	   the	   function	   of	   the	   repetition	   of	  mark-­‐making	  in	  Aboriginal	  art	  is	  to	  engender	  a	  performative	  methexical	  mapping	  of	  Country,	   to	   bring	   Country	   into	   being.35	   Martin	   explains	   that	   we	   see	   this	   again	   in	  Rover	   Thomas’s	   1984	   painting	   Landscapes,	   where	   the	   dots	   become	   an	   indexical	  trace	   of	   the	   jabbing	   action	   of	   painting	   that	   maps	   the	   ground	   and	   produces	   a	  synesthetic	   rhythm	   conveying	   a	   sense	   of	  movement.	   This	   allows	   the	  maker	   to	   re-­‐experience	   Country	   and	   viewer	   to	   grasp	   how	   both	   meaning	   and	   re-­‐experiencing	  emerges	   from	   the	   action	   of	   art	   making.	   This	   double	   articulation	   can	   be	   better	  grasped	  through	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘cathexis’	  and	  ‘methexis’	  as	  they	  are	  explicated	  by	  Kristeva	  via	  Freud,	  and	  Carter	  in	  his	  work	  The	  Lie	  of	  the	  Land.36	  In	  elaborating	   the	   emergence	   of	   revolutionary	   discourse,	   Kristeva	   draws	   on	   Freud’s	  account	  of	  ‘cathexis’,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  as	  a	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  quantity	  of	  drive	  or	   libidinal	  energy	  attaching	   to,	  or	   invested	   in,	  an	  object,	   representation	  or	  mental	  structure.	  A	  build	  up	  of	  cathexis	  can	  lead	  to	  sublimation	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  images	  that	   are	   affectively	   charged.	   Hence	   cathexis	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   aspect	   of	  
internal	  psychic	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  creative	  production.	  	  Methexis	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   refers	   initially	   to	   external	   practices—the	  participation	  in	  performative	  ritual	  or	  memorialisation.	  Paul	  Carter	  describes	  this	  as	  ‘a	  reverent	  miming	  that	  involves	  the	  feeling	  of	  certain	  emotions,	  allowing	  one	  to	  get	  into	  a	  certain	  frame	  of	  mind	  or	  a	  state	  of	  “passionate	  sympathetic	  contemplation”’.37	  In	  this	  notion	  of	  performance	  there	  is	  no	  dichotomy	  between	  actor	  and	  an	  object	  to	  be	   acted	   upon,	   but	   the	   two	   come	   into	   being	   through	   each	   other.38	  Hence,	  we	  may	  conceive	  of	  methexis	  as	  an	  external	  action	  or	  performative	  participation	  that	  gives	  rise	   to	   internal	   processes,	  which,	   in	   turn,	   lead	   to	   creative	   production.	   Further,	  we	  can	   argue	   that	   methexis	   is	   a	   mode	   of	   being-­‐in-­‐practice	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   certain	  cathexes	   through	   which	   aesthetic	   images	   emerge.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	  conception	  of	  methexis	  goes	  beyond	  that	  of	  mimesis	  as	  imitation.	  Rather,	  it	  may	  be	  understood	   as	   the	   ‘inhabiting’	   or	   repetition	   of	   language	   that	   allows	   forms	   to	   be	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apprehended	  anew	  or	  as	  if	  experiencing	  them	  in	  ‘the	  real’	  and/or	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  This	  notion	  of	  methexis	  allows	  us	   to	  appreciate	  virtuosity	   in	   the	  performance	  of	   a	  previously	   composed	  work,	   such	   as	   a	   piece	   of	  music,	   as	   creative	   production	   in	   its	  own	  right.	  In	   Martin’s	   drawing	   practice	   the	   interrelationship	   between	   figuration	   and	  abstraction	   not	   only	   enacts	   this	   methexical	   dimension	   of	   art	   making,	   but	   also	  mirrors	   the	   interrelationship	   between	   the	   material	   and	   the	   immaterial,	   the	  imaginary	  and	  the	  real.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  abstract	  and	  the	  representational.	  In	  his	  Methexical	  Countryscapes	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Figure	  1),	  the	  rhythm	  of	  marks	  made	  using	  charcoal	  on	  paper	  maps	  the	  
texture	  of	  Country	  as	  the	  artist	  has	  experienced	  it.	  The	  scale	  of	  Martin’s	  works	  (2	  metres	  by	  1.5	  metres)	  heighten	  their	  immersive	  quality.	   However,	   it	   is	   Martin’s	   use	   of	   the	   grid	   (each	   work	   is	   made	   up	   of	   thirty	  panels)	   that	   articulates	   the	   relationship	   between	   abstraction	   and	   figuration	   and	  hence	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   concurrence	   of	   representation	   and	   the	   real	   or	  material	   in	  aesthetic	  experience.	  
	  
	  
Figure 1: Brian Martin, Methexical Countryscape Darug 1, 2013, charcoal on paper, 200 x 150 cm; 
courtesy Brian Martin 
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Martin	  explains	  how	  the	  grid	  reveals	  the	  double	  articulation	  that	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  all	  artworks	  and	  of	  the	  viewing	  experience:	  It	   is	  at	   the	  point	  where	  the	  physical	  and	  conceptual	  meet	  that	  the	  viewer	  can	  see	  how	  they	  are	  made.	  It	  is	  this	  aspect	  of	  drawing	  ‘diffractively’	  that	  is	  performative.	  Drawing	  ‘diffractively’	  is	  where	  the	  image	  is	  never	  fully	  seen	  as	  ‘realism’	  because	  it	  is	  diffracted	  by	  the	  grid,	  and	  therefore	  moves	  in	  and	  out	  of	   the	  position	  of	  a	  representationalist	  way	  of	   looking	  at	   the	  world	  …	  Practice	   enforces	  us	   to	   look	   from	  a	  different	  positioning,	   one	   that	  moves	  from	  the	  abstract	  to	  the	  concrete	  concurrently.39	  
	  
	  
Figure 2: Brian Martin, Darug 1, 2013, single panel, charcoal on paper, 210 x 297 mm (detail); 
courtesy Brian Martin 
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Martin’s	  work	  and	  his	  use	  of	  the	  grid	  to	  reveal	  the	  actions	  and	  processes	  of	  art	  making	  and	  the	  material	  qualities	  of	  visual	  language,	  illuminates	  the	  fundamentally	  materialist	   ontology	   of	   Indigenous	   culture.	   His	   work	   refuses	   a	   representationalist	  mode	   of	   thought	   that	   has	   dominated	  Western	   discourse	   since	   the	   Enlightenment	  and	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	   development	   of	   one-­‐point	   perspective	   in	   European	   art.	  Renaissance	  architect	  Filippo	  Brunelleschi	  and	  artist	  Albrecht	  Dürer	  employed	   the	  grid	  to	  establish	  one-­‐point	  perspective	  for	  scaling	  purposes	  and	  to	  transfer	  reality	  as	  humans	   saw	   it	   on	   to	   the	   canvas.	   The	   use	   of	   the	   grid,	   as	   taken	   up	   by	   Renaissance	  artists,	   evoked	   an	   illusion	   of	   three-­‐dimensional	   reality	   by	   transferring	   visual	  elements	  or	  contours	  of	  objects	  from	  one	  scale	  to	  another	  and	  into	  two-­‐dimensional	  form.	   The	   drawing	   then	   stood	   in	   for	   reality—it	   was	   representational.	   While	   the	  viewer	   couldn’t	  walk	   into	   the	  deep	   space	   of	   the	  painting,	   he	   or	   she	   could	  have	   an	  imaginary	   illusion	   of	   depth.	   This	   representational	   thinking,	   in	   which	   the	   real,	   the	  imaginary,	   the	   material	   and	   the	   immaterial	   are	   separated,	   is	   challenged	   by	   the	  materialist	  perspectives	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  present	  in	  this	  essay.	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